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1963] RECENT DECISIONS 339 
SECURITIES REGULA TI ON-SEC RuLE IOb-5-REcoVERY BY COR-
PORATION INDUCED BY FRAUD OF INSIDER To IssuE SHARES-Trustees in re-
organization of a corporation brought suit on its behalf to recover damages 
under section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule IOb-5 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission,2 alleging that the corporation 
1 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any national 
securities exchange • • . 
"(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors." 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1958). 
2 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
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had been fraudulently induced by defendant, its comptroller, to issue stock 
for inadequate consideration. Also named as defendants were the American 
Stock Exchange and several banks and brokers, whose alleged complicity in 
the improper public distribution of the shares made them parties to the 
scheme to defraud the corporation. On a motion by all defendants but the 
comptroller to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, 
based upon the assertion that the corporation had no rights under rule 
IOb-5 where corporate mismanagement was at issue, held, motion to dismiss 
denied. An issuing corporation's right to recover under rule IOb-5 against 
those participating in a scheme to defraud it of its stock is not precluded 
by the fact that the fraud was perpetrated by a corporate insider. Pettit v. 
'American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
A corporation induced by fraud to issue its stock for overvalued com-
pensation was first held to be within the protection of section IO(b) in 
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.,3 where the Fifth Circuit ruled that 
the legislative standard of "in the public interest"4 was broad enough to 
include such a corporation, and that the issuance of stock was a "sale" 
within the meaning of rule IOb-5. While this liberal interpretation has been 
criticized as inconsistent with the legislative history of the 1934 act,5 the 
right of a corporation to avail itself of the benefits of the rule has been 
recognized in several other decisions.6 The principal case, however, is the 
first to uphold a corporate right of recovery under rule IOb-5 for acts which 
would also constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation by an 
insider.7 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange • . • 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1949). 
3 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). Although neither 
§ lO(b) nor rule lOb-5 provides for civil liability, it is well established that a remedy for 
investors is implicit under the principle that a violation of a statute creates a claim in 
favor of an injured party intended to be protected by the act. E.g., Kardon v. National 
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934). For an 
extensive criticism of this result in light of the legislative history of § l0(b), see Ruder, 
Civil Liability Under Rule 10-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 627 (1963). 
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § l0(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1958). 
5 See 59 MICH. L. REv. 1267 (1961); 13 STAN. L. REv. 378 (1961); cf. Ruder, supra note 
3, at 654; Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1948). 
6 H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (allowed without con-
sideration of the problem); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 
1960) (employed as a basis for federal jurisdiction); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 
F.2d 824 (3d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Slavin v. Germantown Fire 
Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum). 
7 Corporations have been permitted to sue in their capacity as investors under rule 
lOb-5. Donovan, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955); 13 STAN. L. REv. 378, 
380-81, nn.7, 8 (1961). 
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The court in the principal case was confronted with dicta in two deci-
sions of its own court of appeals to the effect that the only rights granted 
to a corporate issuer or its stockholders by the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 are those which the statute expressly created. In distinguishing the 
Second Circuit's holding in Howard v. Furst8 that a corporation has no right 
to enjoin improper proxy solicitations under section I4(a)9 and rule 14a-9,10 
the court reasoned that the policy of preventing harassment of insurgents 
in a proxy context, which justified denial of that right, did not apply when 
a corporation had been defrauded of its stock.11 The principal obstacle to 
the court's holding, however, appears to be the dictum in Birnbaum v. 
Newport Steel Corp.12 that section IO(b) and rule l0b-5 were not intended 
to protect a corporation from a breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate 
insider. Conceding that questions of internal corporate affairs should not be 
subject to federal jurisdiction when a purchase or sale of securities is only 
"incidental to a major mismanagement issue," the court in the principal 
case nevertheless reasoned that the participation of corporate insiders should 
not prevent the application of the rule to an illegal securities transaction. 
It would seem that questions of corporate mismanagement to which the 
rule is inapplicable may best be differentiated from stock fraud on the basis 
of an issuing corporation's status as a "seller."13 Such a distinction clearly 
circumvents the Birnbaum decision, since the final holding in that case was 
that the plaintiff corporation, which was not a party to the transaction, 
had not been alleged to be a purchaser or seller and was therefore not 
within the scope of the rule.14 
The court's application of rule I0b-5 in favor of the issuing corporation, 
despite the involvement of an insider, has been criticized on the ground 
that it is inconsistent to impose a federal standard of fiduciary duty in con-
nection with all the internal affairs of a corporation which are related to an 
allegedly fraudulent transfer of its securities, while leaving other aspects of 
corporate management to state Iaw.115 However, if the court was correct in 
upholding the right of the corporation to utilize the rule, it would seem 
even more inconsistent to deny that right only in those cases in which a 
fraudulent scheme includes corporate insiders. A refusal to apply rule IOb-5 
in such cases because of the Birnbaum dicta that section IOb-5 was not 
8 2118 F.2d 790, 7911 (2d Cir. 1956). 
o 48 Stat. 895 (19114), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1958). 
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1949). 
11 The court's distinction appears somewhat superficial, since the policy against harass-
ment of corporate insurgents was not determinative in the Howard case. Moreover, the 
statutory standard to guide the SEC in implementing § 14(a) is identical to the language 
of § I0(b). 
12 1911 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
13 See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 
U.S. 814 (1961). 
H See 11 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1770-71 (2d ed. 1961). But cf. Kremer v. Sel-
heimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
115 See 611 CoLUM. L. REV. 9114, 9411 (19611). 
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directed at fraudulent mismanagement would prevent the application of 
the rule to fraudulent securities transactions which fall within the language 
of the rule. While it is true that there is no basis for imputing to Congress 
an intent to draw into the federal courts all the facets of internal corporate 
affairs on the basis of the rule-making power in section lO(b), neither is 
there any indication that Congress intended to exclude from the purview 
of that section only those fraudulent transfers involving corporate insiders. 
Moreover, there is little possibility that a flood of suits alleging corporate 
mismanagement and basing federal jurisdiction on a securities transaction 
will arise, since it may be inferred from the principal case that an action 
which may be brought in a state court for a breach of the fiduciary duty of 
corporate insiders will not be subject to federal jurisdiction under rule 
lOb-5 unless a fraudulently induced issuance of securities is a major element 
of the alleged mismanagement. Finally, in a derivative suit by trustees in 
bankruptcy or stockholders when a corporation has been defrauded of its 
stock, the advantages of granting a corporate right of action under rule lOb-5 
would appear to outweigh greatly the resulting asymmetry in the law 
governing corporate mismanagement. A right of corporate recovery elimi-
nates the practical difficulties involved in a class action under the rule on 
behalf of a large group of defrauded purchasers.16 If a corporation's action 
for fraud were brought without the procedural and jurisdictional benefits 
of the act, effective recovery would be less likely.17 
The most significant aspect of the decision would appear to be the prom-
ise it holds for avoiding the conflicting and overly technical rules governing 
corporate actions for promoter's illegal profits by the use of rule lOb-5.18 
Promoters have succeeded in escaping liability to the corporation for a sale 
of overvalued property to the corporation in exchange for its stock where 
the promoter, at the time of the transaction, owned all of the authorized 
stock.19 The theory applied is that the company should not be allowed to 
16 See Cherner v. Transatron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962) in 
which the court refused, on the basis of the policy against a fomenting of litigation, to 
authorize the giving of notice by plaintiff's attorney to other investors who were allegedly 
defrauded by violations of the Securities Act of 1933. 
17 See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 
(1961), in which stockholders in a derivative action for a violation of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 were not required to post security for costs. Section 27 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 provides for venue and service of process in any district in which 
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business. See also Hooper v. 
Mountain State Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 
(1961). 
18 See generally Frohling, The Promoter and Rule lOb-5; Basis for Accountability, 
48 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1962). Although the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act 
. of 1933 have greatly diminished the possibility of promoter's fraud, the danger of injury 
to a corporation still exists, since a substantial portion of financing is exempt from 
registration. Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1958). 
19 Hays v. The Georgian, 280 Mass. IO, 181 N.E. 765 (1932); cf. Jeffs v. Utah Power 8c 
Light Co., 136 Me. 454, 12 A.2d 592 (1940). In a minority of courts, the promoter need 
only have purchased all the issued stock to employ this defense. E.g., Old Dominion 
Copper Mining 8c Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908); Ball v. Breed, Elliot 8c 
Harrison, 294 Fed. 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 584 (1924). 
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repudiate a sale to which it has consented. The elements of promoter's 
fraud and those of the principal case are substantially identical, i.e., the 
use of fraud to induce the issuance of stock for inadequate compensation. 
Although the corporate insider in the principal case apparently did not 
control the corporation, the technical defense of consent, which is merely 
a fiction where the promoter occupies both sides of the transaction, should 
be ineffective in a rule IOb-5 action in view of the expanding concept of 
liability-creating conduct under the rule.20 
Since no clear answer concerning the existence of a corporate right of 
action under rule IOb-5 is provided by the cases, or by speculation as to 
legislative intent,21 it would appear that the issue will be resolved, at least 
tacitly, by a consideration of the practical advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative results. Viewed in this light, the availability of federal jurisdic-
tion to an issuing corporation to facilitate effective redress of an injury 
brought about by an insider's rule I0b-5 violation is clearly consistent with 
the broad congressional objective of protecting the integrity of the securi-
ties trading process. 
Charles K. Dayton 
20 See Cady, Roberts 8: Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,I 76803 (SEC Nov. 8, 1961); Com-
ment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123-26 (1950). Promoters have sometimes escaped liability by 
taking an entire issue of no-par shares. E.g., Piggly Wiggly Del., Inc. v. Bartlett, 97 N.J. Eq. 
469, 129 Atl. 413 (1925). It is doubtful whether such a maneuver would preclude liability 
in an action under rule l0b-5, since the fraudulent conduct and the injury to a corpora-
tion are substantially the same when par value stock is issued. See BALLANTINE, CORPORA· 
TIONS 841-42 (1946). But cf. Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963); 13 
STAN. L. R.Ev. 378 (1961). 
21 See authorities cited note 5 supra. 
